Abstract. The paper attempts to identify the extent to which modes of knowledge can be associated with different patterns of and assumptions about power. It discusses the meanings and scope of power itself, i.e. both within and beyond epistemic communities, as against 'social robustness' implying more democratic or inclusive forms of evaluation.
Introduction: The argument
In social science we struggle hard to discover contingent relationships and, perhaps too often, confuse these with what are no more than partial and contestable associations. This paper attempts to note the extent to which knowledge and power may affect each other whilst noting that those interactions are less determinant than some analysts and social practitioners assume.
There are many discussions of the ways in which knowledge is shaped according to the field or tasks to which it is directed. This paper attempts to pick up one derivable theme from these concerns. It attempts to identify the extent to which modes of knowledge can be associated with different patterns of and assumptions about power. It discusses the meanings and scope of power, both within as well as beyond epistemic communities and its bases, e.g., belief in specialisation and peer evaluation, as against belief in ''social robustness' ' (Nowotny et al. 2001) implying more democratic or inclusive forms of evaluation. It explores the range of knowledge modes, and analyses their links with forms of power. It attempts to establish the dynamics of those relationships and shows them to be multi-modal rather than simply contingent on each other. From there it can ruminate on particular examples drawn from governmental and policy practices.
The underlying argument is as follows. Specialist knowledge has intra-mural or internalist power. It is governed by accepted rules of certification within epistemic communities. Whitley (1984) argues that developments in scientific fields are driven by a shared concern of participants with the establishment and maintenance of their reputations, and hence that such fields can be described as ''reputational work organizations''(pp. 25-29). But its second level of power is secular, and depends on the scientist being able to persuade the non-scientist that the work is useful or interesting. The converse might be true. Knowledge that rests on its appeal to the ''shared meanings of given social communities'' or ''social robustness'' might gain power with user groups and gain purchase within those who share its epistemic ideology. But it then might need to demonstrate sufficient of the test and demonstration features of hard science for it to be accepted as fully part of the scientific, intra-mural system. These concerns are carried into two main example areas -the acceptance of research generated knowledge in government, and its impact across the university boundaries into industry and commerce.
Meanings and scope of definitions of power
Our starting point must be the meanings and scope of power itself. Do its defining characteristics entail any particular knowledge components or styles, or are its implications for knowledge more the result of operational or instrumental frames within which is enacted? In addressing the meaning of power, it will be necessary to divest ourselves of some over-simple assumptions, many of which emerge as dualities representing apparently contingent relationships. Thus, to take obvious examples to which we return more fully later, positivist forms of knowledge generation are held to be associated with determined and
